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Religion and nation in 
Europe in the 19th century: 
some comparative notes1
HEINZ-GERHARD HAUPT
THE COLLAPSE of religion along the secularization process was one of the conditions for the success of nationalism since the end of the Eighteenth Century in Europe. This is, at least, the opinion of Hans-
Ulrich Wehler (2003), a German historian, in his new book on nationalism. 
From his perspective, the criticism of religion during the century of the lights, 
the dissociation between the Church and the State as manifested in the civil 
constitution of the clergy during the French Revolution, and the loss of a 
religious guidance by large strata of the population have created a “void” in which 
the nationalism could be inserted and in which it has taken the place of religion as 
a system of faith and guidance (ibidem).
Such replacement has been possible due to the fact that religion and 
nationalism were going to share some common traits and functions: They would 
provide myths of origin, saints and martyrs, holy objects, places and ceremonies, 
a sense of the sacriﬁce and functions of legitimization and mobilization. The 
Jacobinical period in France and the anti-Napoleonic wars were, from this point 
of view, the ﬁrst manifestations of what the French historian Mona Ozouf (1976) 
has named as “transference of sacrality” from the strict religious domain to the 
nation. That is how the sans-culottes used to talk about their “sainte pique”, 
celebrated the Revolution before the “altars of the fatherland” and left to ﬁght in 
holy wars.2
From a historical perspective, however, this approach raises some 
criticisms. The concept of a void, a vacuum, metaphorically underlines the depth 
of an executed change, but does not reveal the complexity of the historical 
constellations and evolutions that are characterized by superpositions of trends, 
the relations between them, their partial fusion or repulsion. The “similarity of 
the non-contemporary” – this formula of the philosopher Ernst Bloch (1935) 
that emphasizes the coexistence of different systems of faith and explanation of 
the world within a given society, systems which possess, moreover, a different 
longevity and temporality – seems more adequate to characterize and interpret 
complex historical situations and moments of historical change. The recent debate 
on nationalism will be also in disagreement with that statement. This 
discussion tends 
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to replace a ﬁxed image of nationalism, based on a primordial concept of nation 
that ﬁnds in it its political expression, a dynamical conception of a system of 
discourse that feeds from different sources: images of society, of the genders, of 
the ethnical conditions, of the past, etc., of which religion is only a portion.3
The change that occurred in the studies on nationalism along the eighties 
caused, instead, a reﬂection about the stand of the religious individual in face of 
other cultural references in the nationalist ideology. After all, the studies on the 
history of religions, along the last two decades, provided a more ﬁnely-shaded 
image of their evolutions. Instead of emphasizing the criticism of religion as 
manifested during the century of the lights and the Nineteenth Century, the 
investigations insist on the different forms of subsistence, that is, of the rebirth of 
the “religious” in the European societies. 
1. As a matter of fact, such religiosity is not necessarily expressed in the picture 
of the established creeds – although those are still important -, but in different 
forms. Even the French republicans did not escape from their attraction, 
even when, as anticlericals, they got together during the Second Empire in 
occultist sessions to make tables move! (Nord, 1995, p.216ss). At the end of 
the Nineteenth Century and the beginning of the Twentieth, the theologian 
Friedrich Wilhelm Graf (2004) even detected the existence of different religious 
markets in which the established creeds had to compete with other systems of 
faith and explanation of the world (cf. Lehmann & Krumeich, 2000). In this 
perspective, there is still less sense in detecting a “void” created by secularization; 
rather, it is necessary to inquire to what kind of religiosity the nationalism of the 
Nineteenth Century could be incorporated. The historiography of nationalism 
has not answered this question completely yet, although it has emphasized the 
connection that exists between nationalism and religious systems.
2. Elias Canetti (1992), originary from the national and ethnical “melting pot” 
of the Balkans and critical observer of the mass movements of the Twentieth 
Century, insists in that the nations can be regarded as religions, and it is mainly 
during the wars that the national and religious feelings get mixed. Norbert 
Elias (1989), historian of the European civilization, points out that nation and 
nationalism are important systems of belief, and eventually regards nationalism 
as the most important faith of the Twentieth Century. Georg Mosse (1976) was 
the one that emphasized, in his book on the nationalization of masses, the fact 
that nationalism is not only a political and social movement, but also utilizes a 
religious language and religious symbols. In his view, nationalism-socialism is 
the expression of that osmosis between nation and religion within the German 
political culture (cf. Echternkamp & Müller, 2002). However, as early as at the 
origin of the scientiﬁc investigation on nationalism, Carlton J. Hayes (1926) 
found out that the nationalism is a religion, since it possesses rituals and martyrs 
and develops a particular national mythology. Finally, the North-American 
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historian Eugen Weber (1986) observed that a historian can be regarded as the 
priest of the nation, for helping to provide the nationalism with a historical 
legitimation.
As a matter of fact, the historiographic debate is not associated to knowing 
if the primacy should be assigned to the religion or the nation. The most 
innovative texts seek to bring to light, especially, the processes of nationalization 
of the religion and of “religionization” of the nation (Walkenhorst, 1996, p.503-
29). Thus, they insist on the value of different approaches. In a study of the 
discourses, they can inquire, based on a categorization made by O’Brien (1988), 
if the nation is regarded, in its positionings, as elected, sacred or divine. In the 
latter case, the nation will be placed among the deities and exempt of any possible 
mundane contestation. It is also important to observe in detail if the nation is 
associated to the concept of sacriﬁce, and how such sacriﬁce is legitimated.
In their turn, the works that focus on the nation’s symbolism inquire to 
what extent this symbolism was borrowed from the existing religions and creeds, 
or was developed in a confrontation with them.4 The actors of this process also 
play a primordial role. The priests and their inﬂuence, the intellectuals and their 
audience, the political men and their strategies are the most important relations 
intervening at the moments of contact between religion and nation.
Many analyses, as different as they may be, emphasize the magnitude 
of the contacts between nationalism and religion and insist on their fusion and 
osmosis. However, a factor of difference is easily cancelled in these statements, 
that is, the fact that religion, in its self-deﬁnition as well as in its message, tends 
towards the after-world, and, for this precise reason, is less subjected to the 
conﬁrmation of reality. Or, in other words: the value of the moral and ethical 
message of religion does not depend, unless in an extremely partial way, on the 
earthly success of this religion. This is a fundamental difference with regard to 
nationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Its promises of success, 
survival or well being should be kept, and, if they aren’t, the religious legitimation 
does not help to ensure the survival of the nation’s representatives.
The Emperor Wilhelm II could invoke the divine right as the source of 
his dynasty and his government, in face of the German defeats: however, during 
World War I, its legitimacy is inexorably disintegrated. This difference also invites 
the historian not to privilege the discursive representations of nationalism, but to 
observe, in detail, the amplitude of its concrete achievements and the connection 
between the promises that were made and the results that were obtained (cf. 
Haupt & Langewiesche, 2001, 2004). 
The following notes focus on a particular stage of the relation between 
nation and religion, that is, on the second half of the Nineteenth and the ﬁrst 
decade of the Twentieth Century. In some European countries, that stage was 
characterized by processes of nation building. This expression values an important 
function of nationalism, namely its effect of integration and modernization 
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of the societies. It can be usefully differentiated from the formation of States-
nation as described, for instance, by Theodor Schieder, and from the working 
up of a nationalistic ideology as the utmost value of a system of faith, although 
nation building cannot be considered without its connections with the other 
components of nationalism. It was Karl W. Deutsch (1953) that valued the 
importance of the systems of communication and interdependence of the different 
portions of a society that are established on the course of the nation building 
process. Eugen Weber (1976) provided, on what concerns to France, an empirical 
analysis of this process, studying, among other aspects, the establishment of the 
market, of the schools, of the military service. Siegfried Weichlein (2006), in his 
turn, focused on the analysis of the German Empire’s uniﬁcation by observing 
the ways of communication between its several regions.
The national States, however, did not act only as factors of 
communication, but tried also to impose themselves as organizing principles of 
the societies, as sources of legitimacy and as references of civic morality. In this 
work of penetration, the national States had to face oppositions, among which 
the strongest and most active were those by the Catholic Church. It opposed to 
the State’s intervention in the systems of education and in the internal operation 
of the Churches, as well as in the public organization of the consolidating 
ceremonies, the mythical heroes, the integrating ideologies.
The debates regarding the place of the Churches in the national societies 
were always accompanied by a conﬂict on the issue of who was going to retain the 
monopoly of interpretation of the past and the present in those societies. Philip 
Schlesinger (1987) highlighted the importance of those conﬂicts by stating that 
“the national cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the 
entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as 
sites of contestation in which competition over deﬁnitions take place.” Friedrich 
Wilhelm Graf (Graf, 2004, p.305) was even more categorical by certifying: “The 
inventors of the nation need linguistic symbols in order to produce a strong and 
emotionally cohesive community.” (cf. Durkheim, 1897-1898, p.20)
Those ﬁghts between, at least, two systems of symbols, two logics of 
integration and two organizations of the collective and ofﬁcial memory have 
opposed, in many European States, the State and the Catholic Church, from 
Portugal to Italy, from France to the Czech portion of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire. In these confrontations, the ﬁghts of power for the effective and / or 
symbolic supremacy occurred in the different States in similar or different forms. 
The following remarks will focus on those similarities and differences, based on 
the examples of France, of Italy, of the Czech portion of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire, and of Germany, along the decades that precede World War I. By means 
of this rather arbitrary choice, we expect to detect a variety of different situations 
that explain not only the conﬂicts between creeds, but also the conﬂicts between 
the newly created national States and the Catholic Church, as well as the place of 
a national movement in face of the Catholic Church.
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In France, Italy and Czechoslovakia, the State or a laic stream stood, 
on the course of the Nineteenth Century, against the Catholic Church.5
This opposition was older in France - due to the fact that, during the French 
Revolution, the revolutionary State forced the clergy to make a civic oath, causing 
a schism within the Church between the priests that made the oath and those 
that refused to make it. The opposition between the two loyalties – on one 
hand, the revolutionary ﬁdelity, on the other hand, the Catholic and counter-
revolutionary devotion – was in the origin of the civil war unleashed in Vendee 
(Martin, 1996). If, under Napoleon, such opposition was attenuated particularly 
due to an agreement with the Holy See, it exploded again when, under the 
Restoration, the Monarchy leaned on the Church. But it was under the Third 
Republic that the conﬂict between the Church and the State found its most 
important expression.
The acts of supporting the Republic and standing for the political and 
social progress were equivalent to anticlericalism; the acts of defending the 
Monarchy and opposing to the Republican and, a fortiori, socialist movement 
were the same as defending the Christian faith and the Catholic Church. 
Following Gambetta’s word of command: “The clericalism, here’s the enemy!”, 
the victorious Republicans made laws to be voted restricting the Institutional 
power of the Catholic Church (McManners, 1972, p.2327-58; Mollenhauer, 
2004, p.202-30). With the establishment of the laic, free and mandatory school 
by means of the educational legislation, a privileged ﬁeld of activity of the 
Catholic Church was reduced. In 1880, the hospitals, previously managed by the 
Church, were laicized; in 1884, divorce was legalized, and, in 1889, a law decreed 
that the priests should obligatorily render military service, like any other citizen. 
The practical application of the law of 1905 on the separation between Church 
and State caused a sometimes violent confrontation between the churchgoers 
and the police force.6 The confrontation between the “two Frances” reached its 
summit and deeply marked the public and intellectual life.
In Italy, differently from France, an agreement between the Holy See and 
the national movement seemed to be possible within the period that preceded 
the revolution of 1848. However, due to the fact that the Pope stood at the 
counter-revolutionary forces’ side, the Church took quarters in its hostility 
toward the national unity, and the priests that participated in the national 
uniﬁcation had to face problems with the ecclesiastic hierarchy (Papenheim, 
2003, p.202-36). This hostility was expressed at both sides after the national 
unity. The State responded to the questioning of the government and the State 
by conﬁscating the Church’s properties, imposing the military service on the 
seminarians and priests, and refusing to acknowledge the religious marriage-
ceremony unless accompanied by the civil marriage. The State exercised in 
a Draconian fashion its right to inspect and consent the ordination of the 
archbishops, in such a way that, in 1864, half of the dioceses possessed no 
archbishops. The Pope’s position hardened when, in 1864, he condemned in 
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his “Syllabus” the “eighty mistakes”, and, in 1870, the Pope’s infallibility was 
afﬁrmed when he speaks ex-cathedra.
The issue of the pontiﬁcal State’s survival was the major obstacle between 
the two actors. The representatives of the Risorgimento proclaimed the march 
over Rome and elevated Rome to a symbol of the recovered national unity. After 
the Rome of the Caesars and the Rome of the Popes, the Rome of the people 
should be constructed against the Pope. With those discourses, they provoked 
and intensiﬁed the suspicion of the Pope, who feared that this expansionist 
rhetoric would lead to the abolition of the pontiﬁcal State. That occurred in 
September 20, 1870 (Verocci, 1997, p.89ss).7 The subsequent decades are 
characterized by a strongly anticlerical behavior by the Left-wing, but under the 
pressure also of the Right-wing, which sought to develop its own symbolic policy 
against the papacy, which was pathetically regarded as a “prisoner inside the 
Vatican”.
In the Czech portions of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, only on the 
second half of the Nineteenth Century a conﬂict between the Catholic Church 
and the laic movement occurred. The Catholic Church was divided into a 
Bohemian and a Moravian Church, which were dedicated to the cult of their 
regional saints: Saint Wenceslas in Bohemia, Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius in 
Moravia (Hroch, 2005, p.55). But it was with the revolution of 1848 that the 
Czech started to refer, more and more, to Jan Hus, the heretic that was burned 
during the Council of Konstanz. Hus was regarded as an important character 
within a European general movement towards progress and an individual 
religion that was based on ethics. In the historians’ writings, the drama plays 
and sermons, Hus was interpreted as a factor of sacralization of the nation that, 
with its sacriﬁce, had permitted the rebirth of the Czech nation. The more the 
political and Catholic negative reaction against this interpretation attacked Hus’ 
erroneous doctrines, the more his image gained popularity and admiration. 
Within a period in which the Catholic Church was losing importance, a national 
and laic interpretation of Jan Hus became relevant and entered in conﬂict with 
the Catholic Church (Schulze-Wessel, 2004, p.135-50).
The German situation was fundamentally different from that of the other 
countries that were mentioned so far, for the German empire had been the stage 
not of an opposition between the laic State and the Catholicism, but of a struggle 
between Protestantism and Catholicism; the Hebrew community did not have 
the same numeric weight. Such confrontation had the objective to achieve the 
cultural hegemony in Germany and the monopoly of the interpretation of the 
national history. The identiﬁcation of the German nation with the history of 
Protestantism, which had already begun before 1871, was reinforced with the 
victory of Prussia against Austria in 1866, and with the outcome of the Franco-
German war. The Protestantism could claim to the Emperor’s faith, which had 
been deﬁned as Protestant. He stood against the Catholic faith, whose loyalty to 
the Pope was construed as antinational, and whose connivance with the enemies 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 22 (62), 2008 83
– often Catholic – of the Protestant Prussia was suspected. During the period of 
the Kulturkampf – literally, of the cultural struggle- after 1871, the difference 
between the Protestant Empire and the Catholic Church exploded.8
In December, the clergy was forbidden to criticize the Empire and its 
constitution ex-cathedra. One year later, Prussia decided to exclude from the 
School inspection all the Catholics. In the same year, the Jesuits’ houses were 
closed and their foreign members were expelled from Germany. From that time 
on, the Catholic priests had to be German citizens and should have studied 
in the State schools of Theology. The State reserved the right to appoint the 
archbishops, and threatened with ﬁnancial penalties those who preferred to leave 
their positions vacant. In this confrontation, the Catholics were perceived as the 
internal enemies, and it was even afﬁrmed that there was a new confession of faith 
in the public and private life: struggles occurred between students of different 
creeds, the inter-creed marriages became more difﬁcult, and consumers chose 
stores that were managed by merchants of their own creed.9
The State aggression to the rights and customs of the Catholic Church 
resulted in a strong resistance by the Catholics, who refused to comply with the 
laws, organized movements of protest, and refused to participate in the holidays 
of national celebration - such as the Sedan Tag, the day that commemorated the 
decisive battle of the Franco-German war. In the organization of the “political 
circles”, as deﬁned by Rainer M. Lepsius, the Catholic environment would 
eventually organize the majority of the Catholic voters, regardless of their social 
origin (Laube, 2001, p.293-332). In the German Empire, the Catholicism found 
itself in a difﬁcult situation, for it should try to ﬁnd its place in a national culture, 
in a national history and in a gallery of national heroes deﬁned by the Protestants. 
Considering that, for a long time, the Catholicism had defended a Germany that 
lived under the domination of (Catholic) Austria, it found itself in an uneasy 
position in face of the victory of (Protestant) Prussia. Moreover, its social-
professional composition was damaging to it, for the Protestantism was supported 
by the great majority of the members of the enlightened bourgeoisie, whose 
importance was smaller within the Catholic sphere. Because the members of that 
bourgeoisie had an outstanding position within the German national movement, 
the Catholics had a limited space to make their voices heard.
Those confrontations, whose general picture we can only outline here, can 
be analyzed in different ways. An interesting interpretation would be to inquire 
about the span of the State action and about the effects, on the societies, of the 
legislation, whose arsenal was similar between the several countries. It would be 
possible, this way, to write a chapter of a history of the State building, and to 
establish the extent to which the modern national State was able to confront the 
institutional and mobilizing force of Catholicism. Seemingly, the importance 
and effectiveness of the State’s action should not be overestimated. The limits of 
the State’s intervention were emphasized even in the German Empire, in which 
a solid State organization is recognized: “The modest reach of the nineteenth-
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century state, whose budgets were about 2 per cent of what they are today, meant 
that the laws were patchily and poorly enforced.” (Burleigh, 2005, p.331).
However, these confrontations should be construed within the picture 
of the relation between religion and nation, for the protagonists were not only 
trying to nationalize the religion – the German Empire is a remarkable example 
-, but also to imprint a religious character on the nation. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf 
(2004) discerned two cases in this context: ﬁrst, the religious constructions of the 
nation, which seek to exceed the picture of the existing creeds in order to detect, 
in a distant, sometimes mythical past, the foundation of the nation. They are not, 
any longer, interested in the contribution of the myths of origin or the national 
histories for the construction of the nation; instead, they postulate a sterner and 
immutable base. That is where the references to the race, the land and to the shed 
blood in a “völkisch” interpretation of nation would ﬁnd their place.
A second trend would constitute the nation as a community of believers, 
by using Christian symbols to ascribe it a sacred nature, resorting to the religious 
liturgy to celebrate it, and developing a history of the national redemption 
(ibidem, p.302ss). In the study of the historic examples, it makes not much 
sense to discern the countries in which, mainly, the nation was ascribed a sacred 
nature, from the other ones, in which a nationalization of what is sacred is being 
witnessed. The two processes are complementary, in spite of their divergence 
from a systematic perspective. The ﬁrst one refers to a re-interpretation of the 
national ﬁgures and the establishment of a civil religion, as developed by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (2005) in his “Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne” 
(“Considerations on the government of Poland”); the second one is characterized 
by a national application of the biblical ﬁgures, of the saints or of the characters 
of the Churches’ history.
In the chapter of the nationalization of religion, we should consider, 
in Germany, the cult of Martin Luther (Schweiger, 1982). The reformer was 
regarded and celebrated as a national hero, for having defended Germany 
against the Pope and the Catholicism. In this perspective, the Reformation 
was celebrated as pre-history of the German national unity. During the 
commemoration of the 400th anniversary of his birth, in November 10, 1883, 
forty thousand speeches were allegedly made in Germany about the Reformer’s 
merits; a Luther Foundation was created to sponsor the higher education of 
the pastors’ and teachers’ children, and a multitude of monuments was built 
and inaugurated in Luther’s honor. The reference to Luther and to a Protestant 
national tradition also helped to differentiate, in history and in the present time, 
in accordance with a Manichaean construction, those who favored the uprising 
of the nation and those who opposed to it. The Middle Ages were regarded, 
from this point of view, as gloomy and ineffective, and the Catholic Church as 
ultramontane and vassal to Rome. The European countries that were regarded 
as enemies of the new German nation, such as France, in their majority Catholic, 
were perceived as “rotten” due to the ultramontanism that prevailed there. With 
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many initiatives and resources, the Protestantism succeeded, under the Empire, to 
promote a “religionization” of the nation and a nationalization of the religion.
The German Catholics responded with the same enthusiasm and with 
similar arguments. Even in 1848, Ignaz von Döllinger contended that the 
“only true national Church is... the Catholic Church” (apud Kuhlemann, 
2004, p.41). In a historical retrospective, Protestantism has been construed as 
a movement of secession, destroying the national unity, proclaiming mistaken 
theological concepts, and being managed by profoundly mundane individuals, 
whose spiritual center was the belly! Against Luther, the Catholics mobilized, 
especially after 1848, Boniface, the “apostle of the Germans”, to emphasize 
that the German nation had been associated, by the time of its birth, to the 
introduction of Christianity. Boniface, whose name derives from the Latin 
bonum facio, was celebrated as the one who, during the AD Eighth Century, 
was assigned by the Pope Gregory II with the mission of Christianizing the 
German provinces. In this missionary action, he was murdered – as the legend 
has it – by pagans from Northern Germany. The missionary and civilizing action 
and the martyrdom were, in Boniface’s Catholic perspective, a good example of 
the efﬁcacy and longevity of the Catholic struggle for the unity of Germany. A
Boniface Association was created in 1849 to support the Catholics that lived in 
Martin Luther (1483 – 1546), theologian and Protestant reformer.
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diaspora in Germany, and even in 1855 the 1,100th anniversary of Boniface’s 
death was celebrated. In 1867, the German archbishops held a meeting next to 
Boniface’s tomb. Kuhlemann veriﬁed that this cult of the missionary has certainly 
contributed to increase the national awareness of the German Catholics.
In the Czech national movement, Hus was regarded, after 1848, as the 
leader of a national movement of protest – the Hussites. He was reverenced for 
his actions, but also as a national martyr, who, with his sacriﬁce, had contributed 
to release the Czech nation. As accurately detected by Martin Schulze-Wessel 
(2004), the reference to Jesus is obvious. This cult was supported by 250 
important intellectuals who, in 1868, left in a peregrination to Constance, 
where Hus had been burned at the stake as a heretic. This “religionization” 
of the nation has found a great resonance on the bourgeois and intellectual 
strata, which, in spite of being Catholic, aimed at the creation of a laic State. 
An outstanding confrontation occurred between Catholicism, which strongly 
marked its distance from the heretic doctrines of Hus, and a laicized and 
nationalized Hus, when the Hus National Association decided to have a 
monument erected in his honor in Prague, at the Altstädter Ring, right on 
the spot where a statue of Mary had been placed after the Thirty Years’ War. 
Following passionate and lengthy debates, a commitment was achieved: the 
decision was made of placing Hus’ monument by the side of Mary’s statue.
In France, a similar effort in order to nationalize a character of the 
ecclesiastic history occurred when the Republicans tried to nationalize the cult 
to Joan of Arc, which had a great importance within the Catholic Church. As
demonstrated by Krumeich (1989), Joan of Arc had achieved a great popularity 
among the Catholic believers and in the popular culture (cf. Winock, 1997, 
p.4427-73). To the “maid of Orleans”, who, thanks to divine inspiration, had 
saved the king, the Republicans opposed a Joan of Arc that had been betrayed 
by the king, by the noblemen and by the Catholic Church, and who had to 
die in order to save France. The Republicans placed among the adversaries of 
Joan of Arc all those that they combated during the Third Republic. However, 
this Republican adaptation of Joan of Arc obtained no popular repercussion 
whatsoever. Instead, the Republicans were more successful in ascribing a 
sacred nature to the national heroes by transferring them to the Church of 
Saint Genevieve. Such decision, made during the Revolution of 1789, was 
abolished during the Second Empire, but renewed under the Third Republic. 
The entombment of the national heroes inside an ancient church raised a strong 
reaction by the Catholics, who regarded it as a profanation and a sacrilege. 
However, in 1855, Victor Hugo - the national poet – was transferred to the 
Pantheon (Ben Amos, 2002).
Also the Italian laic State, under the pressure of a laic Left-wing, 
searched for a symbolism of its own, and hostile to the Catholic Church. 
In the need of creating the Italians after having created Italy as a National 
State, the different Right-wing governments tried to ﬁnd, by means of a 
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policy of memory and celebration, a stronger stand of legitimacy in the Italian 
population. Such effort put them in conﬂict with the Catholic Church, which 
refused to collaborate with the Italian national State, which the Church accused 
of having deprived it of the Pontiﬁcal State and ecclesiastic properties (Tobia, 
1991). As a matter of fact, the successive governments went into war against an 
excessively visible presence of the Catholic iconography, destroying, in Rome, 
efﬁgies and statuettes of saints – just like the French Third Republic had done 
by opposing the Republican Marianne to Mary. At the same time, they tried 
to develop a civic cult to replace, or, at least, to compete with the Catholic 
inﬂuence. The cult to the Constitution, as the one existing in Piedmont, had 
not resulted particularly mobilizing. Instead, the celebration of Garibaldi 
and Victor Emmanuel II as heroes of the national liberation had a greater 
popular repercussion. Like in other European countries, the statues that 
had been erected in their honor and the celebrations manifested the concern 
with a laic cultural reference (Brice, 1998). The building of a monument in 
honor of Giordano Bruno, the anticlerical thinker, at the Campo dei Fiori, 
in Rome, was construed by the Catholic Church as an act of deﬁance, such 
The French heroine Joan of Arc (1412 – 1431)
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as the commemoration, in 1895, of September the 2nd as the festivity of the 
taking of Rome. That celebration was differently interpreted by the different 
political streams. The Right-wing regarded it as the conclusion of the process 
of anticlerical nation building, and the beginning of a reconciliation with the 
Catholic Church; the Left-wing placed it in a process of construction of a new 
and secular Italy.
In a comparative perspective, it is surprising to see how the policies of 
memories and symbols are similar in the four societies we are discussing here. 
They were based on characters of the past, both to celebrate the longevity of the 
national unity that had been created by the Christianization of the country – such 
as Saint Wenceslas, in Czechoslovakia; Boniface, in Germany; Joan of Arc or Saint 
Louis, in France – and to commemorate a rupture of the Catholic unity in the 
past as the beginning of an evolution that led to the national State of the present: 
Jan Hus, Martin Luther, Giordano Bruno, and a Republican Joan of Arc could 
serve as example. In this opposition, the characters of the ecclesiastic history 
were nationalized and inserted into a historical construction, into an “invention 
of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992). The nation and the nation-State 
to which it referred should obtain historical legitimacy and be placed, beyond 
the quotidian actions, within a religious sphere. The nation itself was made 
sacred with those discourses and lost the character of a contingent and historical 
construction. The nation was not deﬁned in a pluralist, open way, but as a closed, 
unique and holistic entity. The sacralization of the nation contributed to give it 
that mandatory, exclusive aspect.
Such confrontation between two different versions of the national history 
resulted in conﬂicts between historians and publicists, but also in different 
symbolizations. The erection of statues, the choice of names of streets and 
national holidays originated stern oppositions between the Catholic Church 
and the laic national State. This opposition was particularly strong in France 
and Italy, but also in the Czech region of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The 
anticlericalism seemed to have been stronger in France, where it was associated 
to an extensive range of liberal, Republican and Socialist positions. It was more 
controversial in Italy, and became a battle-horse in the Czech national movement 
against the government of that time. In Germany, instead, the anticlericalism 
did not have the same weight as in the other three countries, in spite of having 
been developed with the social-democratic movement. The ﬁght between the 
two creeds for the cultural hegemony and the power of symbolic imposition in 
the Empire was predominant, and inﬂuenced the symbolic struggles and the 
chosen forms of manifestation. If, in the other European countries, the laic State 
should ﬁght against a massive presence of the Catholic Church, against which it 
should establish its legitimacy, its national narratives and symbolisms – such as in 
Italy or Czechoslovakia -, or preserve them – such as in France -, in Germany the 
situation was different. The Catholic Church should be inscribed into a national 
tradition that was deﬁned by the majority of the population and by the German 
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Empire as Protestant, and should inﬂuence the discourses that constructed the 
German nation by excluding the Catholics as loyal to a foreign power and hostile 
to a Protestant version of the German past.
It would be tempting to measure the impact of those symbolic struggles 
on the public opinion and the population. However, the studies of reception 
are comprised in the most difﬁcult exercises of historical style, due to the 
scarce sources and the big methodological problems. A promising approach 
to deal with this problem was chosen by Oliver Janz (2002, p.61-75), who 
investigated the religious references that were used, during World War I, by the 
authors of publications that were often private, or semipublic, in memory of the 
Italian ofﬁcers and soldiers killed on the battleﬁeld. Janz gathered a group of 
2,300 writings, of which 95% made reference to the nation, without, however, 
expressing anticlerical feelings. In his analysis, those writings do not show 
the success of an anticlerical campaign, but the symbiosis between a national 
interpretation of the war and death as described in a religious language. The dead 
are regarded as martyrs of a so-called “holy” war, and the texts express a cult of 
the patriotic sacriﬁce that would result – with an unmistakable reference to the 
religious conception – in the rebirth of a new Italy. The national and religious 
semantics is narrowly connected in those texts, which can, therefore, demonstrate 
that an anticlerical version of the nation seems to have had few effects; in its turn, 
the connection between the religious references, the invocation of the nation and 
the individual fate is present in the texts of celebration.
In order to measure the importance of this process of nationalization 
of religion and “religionization” of the nation, we can also wonder about the 
consequences of those discourses during the years preceding World War I. In 
Italy, the Right-wing had tried to attain to a commitment with the Catholic 
Church and avoid manifestations and publications that could be regarded as 
anticlerical. As a matter of fact, the attitude of the Catholic Church was changing 
as well. With the encyclical Rerum Novarum, the Pope signalized a relative 
openness toward the modern world, and allowed the national Churches to set 
out for a policy of commitment with the laic National States (Burleigh, 2005, 
p.365ss). This did not produce deep effects in France, where the Catholics 
had eventually adopted the national symbols such as the tricolor ﬂag and the 
commemoration of July 14, but where the separation between the Church and 
the State of 1905 unleashed new conﬂicts and increased the rupture between the 
laic Republicans and the Catholic believers. It was only World War I that allowed 
the Catholic Church to participate in the defense of the national unity and the 
“sacred” cause of the nation, without, however, eliminating the fundamental 
differences between the “two Frances” (Mollenhauer, 2004, p.228ss).
On what concerns to Germany, it was mainly Kuhlemann (2004, p.46ss) 
who took interest in the effects of a sacralization of the nation. He emphasizes 
the importance of the Protestant pastors that, due to the universal character of 
faith, are opposed to an exclusive deﬁnition of nation. They agree with the liberal 
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and bourgeois Catholics in requesting a separation between Church and State, 
and collaborate on the communitarian sphere as well as in charity associations or 
Christian organizations. In their turn, the Catholic and Protestant Conservatives 
can also experience the defense of the dynasty and of the established order in 
face of the ascending social-democracy. They agree in the defense of family, 
religion and State, for fear of a State without God. In a certain way, they were the 
precursors of the Christian Democracy as it will emerge in Germany after 1945. 
Certainly, the war itself reconciled the ruptures in Germany and contributed to 
unite the German Catholics to the German nation more than occurred with their 
French coreligionists.
The most important and politically most dangerous approximation 
between Catholics and Protestants in Germany, and between laics and Catholics 
in Czechoslovakia, happened on another base. When the conﬂict in Prague on 
the placement of the statues of Mary and Hus was settled with a commitment, 
the discourses that were delivered then did not make reference to the enmities 
of the previous day, but tried to construct a unity between laics and Protestants, 
insisting on nationalist and anti-Semitic themes. It was with the exclusion of the 
Jan Hus (1369 – 1415), thinker and religious reformer.
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national and religious minorities that the peace between those two opposite forces 
was achieved (Schulze-Wessel, 2004, p.143). In Germany as well, a systematic 
study has revealed that it was mainly after 1918 that the difference between a 
Catholic and Protestant deﬁnition of the nation tended to disappear, to give place 
to a deﬁnition that goes back to the origins of the German nation and emphasizes 
the bond of blood and race between its members (Steinmetz, 2001, p.217ss). The 
semantic evolution is, therefore, behind time on what concerns to the evolution 
of the German nationalism, which, even along the 1890s, had set forth toward 
an exclusive nationalism, founded on the ethnic origin (ibidem). When the main 
reference was not the creed any longer, but the ethnic origin, the Catholics could 
easily become members of the German nation and enjoy their rights. However, 
this “völkish” deﬁnition of the German nation excluded not only the Polish, 
who lived as the most abounding Catholic minority in Germany, but the Jews 
as well. A nationalism that was founded on the ethnic origin and formulated in 
an exclusive fashion was equally hostile to the creation of a republic such as the 
Weimar one, and opposed to it. This kind of nationalism offered the weapons and 
pointed the enemies for the National Socialism.
Notes
1  This article is based on the results of two conferences that Dieter Langewiesche 
(Tübingen) and I organized and published: Nation und Religion in der deutschen 
Geschichte (Frankfurt; New York, 2001); Nation und Religion in Europa. 
Mehrkonfessionelle Gesellschaften im 19. und 10 Jahrhundert (Frankfurt; New York, 
2004). The results were presented and discussed in a seminar held at the School of 
Doctorate of San Marino. I thank the investigators for their comments and reviews.
2  Cf., recently, Martin (1996).
3  Cf., for instance, the application of a Constructivist analysis to an empirical study (Müller, 
2002). For a picture of the investigation’s evolution, see Eley & Suny (1996, p.3-37).
4  See, for example, the special issue of Temps Modernes, v.550, Mai 1992: «Symbolique et 
identité nationale dans l’Europe contemporaine».
5  For the general evolution, see Rémond (1998) and Burleigh (2005).
6  See the booklet by Mayeur (1966).
7  For this argumentation, see Janz (2004, p.231-52). 
8  For the history of the Kulturkampf within an international context, see Burleigh (2005, 
p.311ss).
9  The article by Kuhlemann (2004, p.27-63) is fundamental.
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ABSTRACT – This essay aims to analyze the relation between nation and religion from 
the second half of the 19th century to the ﬁrst decade of the 20th century, during the 
process of Nation building that could be observed in several European nations. We 
propose a comparative analysis of the following cases: France, Italy, the Czech part of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Germany. Considering the recent researches on the 
afﬁrmation of nationalism in that period, we respond to the simplistic statement that the 
success of nationalism depended on the ruin of religion after the end of the 18th century. 
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